Achieving optimal use of wildlife resources is opportunity sets to demand. Opportunity efa classic problem in natural resource economfects were first discussed by Clawson who asics. Ciriacy-Wantrup argued that wildlife reserted that recreation demand was a function sources are a case of a fugitive resource for of changing recreational opportunities as well which private property rights cannot easily be as factors normally ascribed to demand [6, p. defined and therefore government policy may 116]. He implied, but did not explicitly state, be necessary to obtain optimal use [5, pp. 141- that the availability of opportunities affected 145]. Land use planning is one area of demand through an adaptation of Arrow's government policy in which limited attention learning by doing concept [1] . Cicchetti, has been given to management of wildlife reSeneca, and Davidson [4, p. 55] and Davis and sources. One reason for the neglect may be the Seneca [7] formally employed this concept to lack of emphasis on estimating the value of rationalize the inclusion of lagged variables rewildlife recreation experiences associated with flecting past availability of recreation opporparticular land uses. An exception is the work tunities in a demand model. of Martin, Tinney, and Gum [16] who did not
Learning by doing was later cast in the static look at marginal land use changes but did conLancaster theory of demand [2] . Within such a sider the termination of all cattle ranching in framework, households are considered akin to Arizona and its effect on recreational and agrismall factories combining such inputs as raw cultural economic surpluses. materials, capital goods, and labor to produce The authors adapt standard wildlife recreaconsumption commodities [12, p. 340] . In this tion demand methodology to provide estimates approach learning by doing affects demand for of value of a particular land use for wildlife rerecreation experiences through the consumer's creation experiences. In this analysis, land use production technology [2, p. 102] which is alis treated as defining unique recreational optered by large changes in prices resulting from portunities, a concept which has been conchanges in the availability of recreational opsidered in previous recreation demand studies portunities. [2, 4, 7, 18] . Using this concept, one can estiConsumer choice for recreational experiences mate the value of a particular land use as the could be approached similarly within Becker's change in consumer surplus arising from a framework which also abandons the traditional change in the opportunity set defined by a parseparation between production and consumpticular land use.
tion. Preferences are assumed a function of a The specific objectives of this article are: (1) set of commodities produced by the households to review the theoretical justifications for conthemselves by combining different market sidering recreational opportunities in recreagoods, time, and other inputs in the production tion demand functions, (2) to present an empirifunction, particularly "environmental cal model for big game hunting demand in variables." Environmental variables appear in Georgia which includes forestland acreage, an the demand function because the input-output indicator of available hunting opportunities, as relationships in the household production funcan independent variable, and (3) to adapt stantion are altered by changes in these variables dard methodology to provide an estimate of [3, pp. 41-48] . In a recreational context, the changes in consumer surplus for big game availability of recreational opportunities could hunting due to recent changes in forestland in be considered an environmental variable which Georgia.
alters the amount of inputs required to produce the recreational experience. Oliveira and RECREATION DEMAND AND THE Rausser [18] represented by S, the supply is greater than approach is simpler, requiring only a utility the quantity demanded at zero price and supfunction and an income constraint to deduce ply does not affect demand. If supply is reprethe hypothesis that availability of recreational sented by Si, the recreational market does have opportunities affects demand for recreation. In an interaction between supply and demand. contrast, other approaches yield the same reEven though aggregate demand equals aggreduced form demand equation from a more comgate supply at a nonzero price, recreators still plex theoretical structure. In addition, Maler's attempt to consume Q because a market does theory establishes that changes in consumer not exist for the natural resources utilized in surplus resulting from shifts in demand curves the recreation experience. The excess demand, due to changes in environmental quality can be Q 1 Q, however, results in a restriction in the interpreted as the value of environmental num b er of recreational opportunities of the quality [15, pp. 178-191] .
same quality. The quality of the recreational This theoretical review indicates that at experience can have several important dimenleast four theoretical frameworks justify inclusions; fishing success [20] and congestion [8, sion of factors affecting recreational opportuni-17] are two quality dimensions given emphasis ties, such as land use changes, in recreational in past studies. demand functions. However, previous applications are unclear as to how the supply function The upper graph represents the decision pro-P0 cess of a representative recreator in reference to participation in recreation activities and is similar to a model of Kalter and Gosse [14] . Initially, the recreator has a demand curve d -qfor an experience of a particular quality. Under These restrictions in the availability of recFh = last year's number of forestland reation experiences of a given quality can afacres divided by the total land acres fect the decisions of participants in two differin the household's county of resient ways. If quality is localized, the recreator dence can achieve the same experience, but at a higher price. In Figure 1 , the individual supply u h = an error term. curve shifts upward to Pi resulting in a reduction in quantity demanded to q 1 . This reducAll current data are for 1971 and are from a tion in quantity demanded in turn causes a Georgia survey completed in 1974 [10] ; lagged shift of the derived demand to D 1 where Q 1 repharvest and forestland acreage are for 1970 resents the sum of ql. If the deterioration is [11] . more general, consumers will be unwilling to Except for forestland acreage, all consume as many recreational experiences and independent variables have been used in previthe individual demand curve shifts to di.
ous recreation demand studies. Average cost Equilibrium is achieved when the aggregate has become a standard price "proxy" in recreademand curve shifts to Di where the excess detion demand equations and income has apmand causing the quality deterioration is peared in a number of past studies [2, 4, 6, 19] . eliminated. In many cases, shifts in both in-
The inclusion of lagged harvest, an indicator of dividual demand and price contribute to the hunting quality, is also consistent with past equilibration process. studies [7, 19] . Though individual observations From this perspective, supply of recreational on harvest would have been superior, unavailopportunities serves as a demand shifter ability of such data required an assumption similar to other economic and preference varithat hunting success was constant for all ables. For empirical application, the hypotheparticipants in each county. The large number sis that the availability of recreation opportunof counties in Georgia (159) makes this asities affects demand can be tested by inclusion sumption less critical than it would be for a of the appropriate supply variable in the state with fewer counties. Land use variables demand model. If this hypothesis is true S1 repsuch as water acreage were used by Davis and resents the appropriate supply curve; if false, Seneca [7] but were found not to be significantthe appropriate supply curve is S and the ly related to hunting demand. The land use availability of recreational opportunities does variable considered, forestland acreage, was not affect demand.
proportioned for two reasons: (1) to forestall heteroskedasticity and (2) to reflect the hy-EMPIRICAL DEMAND MODEL pothesis that congestion in use of forestland for hunting was related to demand for hunting The empirical demand model used in this arexperiences. tide is adapted from a previous study of wild-
The empirical model incorporates two aslife recreation in Georgia [22] . The hypothesis sumptions that are more specific than the theothat the amount of available forestland affects retical framework considered in the preceding demand for big game hunting was tested by ussection. First, use of amount of forestland in ing the following model: county of residence reflects the assumption that this forestland represents hunting oppor-(1) lnQh = a + biACh + b2Ih + b3Hh + b 4 Fh + tunities available to the recreator. Because all uh of Georgia is heavily forested and supports a large game population, this assumption seems where reasonable. Even the counties in which the major cities of Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, lnQh = the natural log of the quantity of big Macon, and Savannah are located had an avergame hunting occasions consumed age deer population of 1210 compared with the by household h state average of 1400 per county in 1970 [10] . Though recreators probably do not confine all a = an intercept term their hunting to their home county, any alternative formulation seems even more arbitrary. ACh = average cost per occasion for houseThe second assumption is that the forestland hold h variable reflects congestion and other factors associated with quality other than harvest. I h = income for household h This assumption is based on the view that forestland is not sufficiently limited as to afHh = last year's big game harvest per perfect harvest; this view is supported by a low son in the household's county of recorrelation coefficient, .14, between the harsidence vest and forestland variables.
Ordinary least squares regression results for c = the added cost (such as a site enequation 1 are presented in Table 1 . The questrance fee) To predict the effect of a change in forestland $25,000 (the under $3000 dummy was dropped on the quantity of big game hunting occasions and an intercept term included). Signs for all demanded, equation 1 was rewritten: coefficients of the independent variables are consistent with a priori expectations. Of parti-(5) lnQ' = a + b 4 (Fh + fh) + E bk X, + uh cular note is that the coefficient for forestland k acreage is positive and significant at the a = where fh = the change in available forestland .05 level, implying that land use changes which divided by the total land acres in the housealter the amount of available forestland in hold's county of residence and Q' = the estiGeorgia will also affect the demand for big mated number of occasions demanded by game hunting experiences. This result suphousehold h given a change in available forestports the hypothesis that the amount of availland. Subtracting equation 4 from equation 5 able forestland, an indicator of the availability and simplifying yields: of big game hunting recreation experiences, has a significant effect on demand. bfh of crop production shifts in Georgia [20] were here used to estimate fh. Big game hunting = the. estimated1w-numroffn ocsn tecasurpluses, with and without a forestland Qh = the estimated number of occasions change (fh), were then estimated. These sample demanded by houshold h estimates were multiplied by an appropriate 100 expansion factor to derive state estimates.' Re-CONCLUSIONS suits of this analysis are presented in Table 2 .
RTABLE-2. THE EFFECTS OF FOREST-
The Consideration of these demands may result in 1976. In terms of efficiency, the recreation much greater consumer surplus changes than benefits would not be sufficient to have justiare indicated here. In addition, it must be fied preventing these changes with public polistressed that the reduction in forestland did incy. This proposition is based on the view that volve a redistribution of welfare away from big landowners would require larger increases in game hunters to other groups such as conrent than $1.53 per acre to not convert forestsumers of agricultural commodities. land to agriculture. However, other collective
In general, the results of this study indicate benefits of forestland in addition to big game that land use changes may affect various types hunting could still justify maintenance of of recreation demand. Such effects could be forestland. Conceptually, a complete analysis predicted prior to policy decisions if knowledge would entail deriving such collective benefits of the sensitivity of recreation demand to certo other groups and comparing these with the tain land use changes were available. The findbenefits to consumers of agricultural products ings of this study suggest that additional rethat would be gained if the forestland moved search on the relationship between land use into crop production. Because all collective and recreation demand for different geographic benefits would be extremely difficult if not imareas and recreation activities is warranted. In possible to measure, a more feasible approach particular, the effects of relaxing the assumpwould be to compare the recreation consumer tions used in this study about the relationship surplus effects of a land use change with the between forestland acreage and recreational economic surplus effects to agriculture. 2 demand should be examined. ' The expansion factor used was 1528.79 which is equal to the number of households in the state as of 1970 (1, 374, 384) divided by the total number of households (899) from the sample upon which this empirical study was based. The random sample included participants in wildlife recreation activities other than game hunting. as well as households that did not participate in any form of wildlife recreation.
'See Martin et al. [161 for one such analysis between hunting and cattle ranching in Arizona.
